R
apidly rising physician payments have led to increases in premiums under Part B of Medicare, assuring that options to reduce Medicare physician fees will receive serious attention. However, potential cutbacks in the amounts the federal Medicare program pays physicians raise concerns about shifting financial burdens to Medicare's elderly and disabled beneficiaries through "balance billing." Balance billing arises when a physician's fee exceeds Medicare's allowed payment rate, and the physician does not accept the allowed charge as payment in full, that is, on nonassigned claims. Policymakers, concerned that balance billing may place undue financial burdens on beneficiaries, have examined ways to prohibit balance billing through mandatory assignment.
Background
Medicare has had a relatively liberal balance billing policy compared to other nations and to the US. Medicaid program. Before October 1983, physicians who did not accept assignment had to bill the patient directly for the full amount charged; this amount could be more than Medicare's allowed charge. Patients could collect from Medicare the allowed charge less the deductible and coinsurance. The advantage to physicians in this instance was the ability to charge more than the allowed charge and to balance bill for the difference; the disadvantage was that they had to collect the entire amount from patients and bear the cost of collection and the risk of bad debts. Physicians choosing to accept assignment, on the other hand, were reimbursed directly by Medicare for an amount equal to the allowed charge less the patient's deductible and coinsurance liabilities. The physician had to collect these from the patient directly but could not bill the patient for any charges in excess of the Medicare allowed amount.
There was considerable dissatisfaction with this Medicare assignment policy because assignment rates were relatively low (approximately 50 percent in 1982), efforts to control costs by lowering allowed amounts shifted the financial burden to patients, and the burden of balance billing was distributed unevenly among patients. As a result, the 1983 Deficit Reduction Act (DEFRA) required physicians to choose whether or not to participate in the program. Participating physicians would have to accept Medicare fees as payment in full. Nonparticipating physicians could choose to accept assignment case by case as in the past. Participants were to have their fee screens updated after fifteen months (by January 1, 1986). As an incentive to participants, other providers would not receive fee updates and were not permitted to increase actual billed charges to patients. DEFRA incorporated other provisions such as publishing lists of participating doctors to encourage participation.
Subsequent to passage of DEFRA, Congress extended the freeze on Medicare physician payments and nonparticipating physicians' actual charges until January 1, 1987. The 1986 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) provided for an increase of 4.15 percent in the maximum allowable charges for participating physicians. These changes created further incentives for physicians to participate since both the actual and allowed charges of nonparticipating physicians remained frozen.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (OBRA) eliminated the freeze on actual charges by nonparticipating physicians. It did, however, limit the extent to which nonparticipating physicians could increase their rates. Those physicians whose actual charges exceeded 115 percent of the national average prevailing charge for the procedure (maximum allowable actual charge, or MAAC) could increase charges by only 1 percent. Those whose fees were less than 115 percent of the national average could increase by up to 25 percent, as long as they did not exceed the maximum allowable charge limit. In addition, the statute established a 4 percent differential between the prevailing charges of participating and nonparticipating physicians. In essence, the bill limited the ability of nonparticipating physicians to balance bill, and it formally established a differential in prevailing charges favoring participants over nonparticipants.
Concern over balance billing continues, even though assignment rates are increasing. The burden on beneficiaries remains high, particularly in some parts of the country. Furthermore, rapidly rising increases in Medicare expenditures virtually assure that reimbursement rates will be constrained even more tightly in the future. Moreover, any increases in Medicare fees, given current and projected budgetary pressure, most likely will be slower than fee increases in private markets. Since several research efforts have shown that decisions to assign claims depend in part on the ratio of billed to allowed charges, there may well be declines in assignment rates that offset the recent growth. 1 The result is that discussion of policies to restrict balance billing or mandate assignment for all or many types of services is likely to intensify in coming years.
The issue of balance billing also is receiving considerable attention at the state level. Massachusetts passed legislation in November 1985 requiring physicians to accept all of their Medicare patients on assignment or lose their license to practice in the state. Vermont now prohibits physicians from charging patients with incomes of $25,000 or less ($32,000 per couple) any amount in addition to Medicare's allowed payment rates; office and home visits are exempt from this ban on balance billing. Connecticut also enacted legislation prohibiting balance billing; it exempted Medicare beneficiaries whose annual income was $19,950 or less ($24,000 per couple). As of November 1988, at least ten other states were considering mandatory assignment legislation.
This article reviews recent evidence on assignment, providing data on changes in assignment between 1983 and 1985. It provides a critique of both current policy and mandatory assignment. We conclude that an ideal policy should: (1) create strong incentives for physicians to accept assignment, while still permitting balance billing, but (2) take formal steps to assure that low-income, less healthy beneficiaries are exempt from most balance billing.
Recent Changes In Assignment Rates And Balance Billing
The DEFRA physician participation policy appears successful. As shown in Exhibit 1, assignment rates grew substantially in every state between 1983 and 1985. Overall, the assignment rate grew from 51 percent to 67 percent. The ratio of billed to allowed charges on nonassigned services, a measure of balance billing burden, increased slightly from 1.3 1 to 1.38. Because nonparticipating physicians cannot increase their billed charges, the increase in the ratio of billed to allowed charges must be due to a shift in the composition of physicians with nonassigned claims. The increase in the ratio of billed to allowed charges implies that doctors with a low ratio were more likely to participate, leaving nonassigned care to the higher-charge physicians. Exhibit 2 shows that the increase in assignment rates was consistent across all types and places of service and across all individual specialties. Reasons for caution. While the increase in assignment rates may encourage policymakers, there are three reasons for caution. First, physi- Note: Assignment rates are calculated based on the ratio of assigned allowed charges to total allowed charges for all physician specialties. Nonphysician practitioners are excluded. The ratio of billed to allowed charges is based on the same practitioners.
cians with a low billed-to-allowed-charge ratio were more likely to choose to participate and accept assignment. Thus, if Medicare policy results in reductions in allowed charges relative to private charges, in the next few years the increase that we have observed from 1983 to 1985 may be shortlived. Second, assignment rates are still low in many areas of the country. While nine states have 1985 assignment rates greater than 80 percent and two greater than 90 percent, ten states have assignment rates below 50 percent and twenty below 60 percent. Given the variations between specialty and type and place of service in assignment rates, it follows that assignment rates for some types of services in some parts of the country MANDATORY ASSIGNMENT 71 are particularly low. Assignment rates for orthopedic surgeons, for example, were 56 percent in 1985, and the ratio of billed to allowed charges was 1.41, meaning that almost half of the services provided by orthopedic surgeons entailed balance billing of rather large proportions.
Exhibit 3 shows that balance billing of Medicare beneficiaries in the United States with at least one allowed claim amounted to approximately $2.4 billion in 1985. This is approximately half of the amount that these beneficiaries paid in deductibles and coinsurance under Medicare Part B. Exhibit 3 also shows that balance billing is distributed quite unevenly among these beneficiaries. Thirty-seven percent had no nonassigned claims and, as a result, faced no balance billing. Of the remaining beneficiaries, 92 percent faced. very little balance billing (less than $500 for all of 1985). About 2 percent of the Medicare population with at least one allowed claim (about 1.3 percent of all enrollees), however, faced over $1,000 of balance billing in 1985. This 2 percent incurred over onethird of the total amount of balance billing. Since these individuals are probably in poor health, they face large overall medical expenses (including large copayments). Unless these individuals have fairly high incomes, this can be a serious burden. Even beneficiaries experiencing lesser amounts of balance billing may find it to be a severe hardship if their incomes are inadequate.
Finally, the data in Exhibit 3 also illustrate why balance billing is so important to physicians. Let us assume that all of the approximately 500,000 physicians treat Medicare patients. Since approximately twothirds of physicians are nonparticipants, this would imply that 335,000 physicians are balance billing Medicare patients. Therefore, the average 
Objectives Of Balance Billing Policy
Because Medicare is responsible for only 20 percent of expenditures on physician services, designing an appropriate policy toward balance billing in this country is more complicated than it would be for a public reimbursement system that covered the bulk of physician services. Barring "all-payer" arrangements, which seem highly unlikely, the policies of Blue Cross/ Blue Shield and commercial insurers place important constraints on the range of choices available to Medicare. There are several desirable objectives of any balance billing policy, not all of which can be achieved simultaneously.
Assure access to a wide range of physicians. A policy that makes it relatively easy to balance bill assures the availability of a wide range of physicians to Medicare patients by giving physicians the chance to receive the same remuneration for Medicare as for other patients. Access is increased because the pool of available physicians is larger.
Minimize the financial burden on beneficiaries. A policy that makes it difficult to balance bill will reduce the financial burdens on some patients. However, if many physicians opt out of Medicare because of restrictions on balance billing, patients might in effect have massive financial burdens since they would be responsible for the entire bill when they go to a nonparticipating physician.
Control program costs. Efforts to meet the first two objectives may make it difficult for the program to control its costs. The objective to minimize financial burden could require sizable increases in allowed fees in the presence of balance billing; this could also be seen as a way of avoiding a large dropoff in the numbers of participants. It is more likely, however, that balance billing will serve as a safety valve that actually helps Medicare control its costs.
2 Without the ability to balance bill, the level of Medicare fees would become more important to physicians. They would be much more likely to organize and effectively negotiate fee increases than if balance billing were available as a safety valve.
Assure equity among physicians. Various changes in Medicare pay-ment policy, such as fee freezes and the subsequent limited updates or the adoption of a fee schedule, ultimately will reduce differences between physicians in allowed payment rates. Balance billing permits more qualified physicians, physicians in expensive locations, or physicians offering greater convenience or extra amenities to bill in excess of the program fee levels, If some patients are willing and able to pay for these services, then their access is enhanced by permitting balance billing, though at increased financial burden. Policies that make it hard to balance bill require policymakers to build adjustments for appropriate interphysician differences into the fee structure itself, which may be difficult.
Current Policy Versus Mandatory Assignment
Mandatory assignment is often suggested as an alternative to the physician participation program, which permits but limits balance billing. In this section, we consider how well these two options meet the above objectives.
Current policy. Current policy, the physician participation program, permits nonparticipants the choice of balance billing case by case. It provides incentives to expand the pool of physicians participating in the program so that beneficiaries have a greater choice of physicians willing to forgo balance billing. The incentives to participate and assign all claims are stronger than in a pure case-by-case arrangement because balance billing by nonparticipants is constrained, and a differential, albeit small, between prevailing charges of participants and nonparticipants has been established. However, the difference between billed charges and reimbursement rates may be enough to keep many physicians from participating. Only if nonparticipants' billed charges and reimbursement rates are constrained for a long enough period while participants' reimbursement rates are continuously updated will there be a long-term payoff to participation.
Assuming that differences in the treatment of participants and nonparticipants are continued, participation and assignment rates should increase. Therefore, the availability of a wide range of physicians is assured because Medicare beneficiaries may still receive care from nonparticipants. Financial burdens on the elderly are lower than before because charges of nonparticipants are limited to the MAAC ceilings and because assignment rates are higher. These financial burdens remain high, however, for care provided by some specialties and in some parts of the nation.
Program costs clearly are reduced with the fee constraints because reimbursement rates of both participants and nonparticipants increased more slowly than they would have under the historical Medicare system of customary, prevailing, and reasonable charges or if fees were increased by, say, the Medicare Economic Index. Any volume or intensity responses resulting from the fee constraints are unlikely to offset fully the lower fees and to maintain or raise program costs. With balance billing restrained, however, prospects for continued control over rates may be limited as fees from Medicare beneficiaries fall increasingly below fees from private patients. Pressure to increase rates to maintain access is likely to occur.
Current policy also recognizes implicitly that some interphysician differences merit greater compensation by enabling nonparticipants to bill in excess of Medicare allowed fees. Of course, the extent of the fee differentials has been limited by the MAAC. The extent to which compensation differentials are adequate clearly depends on how long freezes are continued, the amount of extra billing that is retained, and differences in reimbursement rates between participants and nonparticipants.
Mandatory assignment. The intent of mandatory assignment is to reduce the financial burden of balance billing on beneficiaries, thereby assuring that efforts to restrain the growth in Medicare fees will not result in shifts to beneficiaries. The approach toward participating physicians would be the same as under current policy. However, unlike current policy, patients treated by nonparticipating physicians would not be eligible for Medicare reimbursement.
The principal weakness of mandatory assignment is its potential to limit access. Patients could lose access to physicians who have sufficient private demand for their services to choose not to participate. While the financial burden of participants' patients would not change, those forced to see nonparticipants would have dramatic increases in their out-ofpocket costs. These problems may be particularly severe for patients whose physicians currently assign few claims and for whom Medicare is a relatively small share of their practices. In addition, physicians who do participate may respond to lower fees by providing fewer services to Medicare beneficiaries or by limiting the types of services they provide. The effects of mandatory assignment depend on how many physicians choose to participate and the amount of care they are willing to provide. If the vast majority of physicians participate, patient access under mandatory assignment and current policy would be similar.
Advocates argue that physicians are too dependent on Medicare for the majority not to participate. As we have seen, however, this dependence varies among specialties and types of services and among geographic areas. Unlike a national health insurance plan that covers all citizens, Medicare directly accounts for only 20 percent of physicians' MANDATORY ASSIGNMENT 75 revenues on average. The experience with Medicaid, where physician participation rates are relatively low and vary with Medicaid payment rates, provides sufficient reason for concern. Mandatory assignment could have a smaller impact on access if it were limited to services (such as surgery, pathology, or radiology) for which assignment rates are already relatively high and for which Medicare is a large share of the typical physician's practice.
Mandatory assignment is likely to increase program costs as well. Initially, Medicare payment rates may have to be raised for physicians to accept the policy. Subsequently, evidence of low participation rates or public perceptions that physicians are limiting care to Medicare beneficiaries would encourage increased reimbursement rates. To not exacerbate access problems, Medicare would have difficulty holding its rate increases at levels much lower than those of private insurers, historically well above the rate of inflation.
Even when participation is not a problem, such as in specialties providing a large volume of service to Medicare beneficiaries or geographic areas with abundant supplies of physicians, the level of fees would be a major issue. Without the avenue of balance billing, physicians may be more likely to organize and lobby effectively for fee increases. Medicare fees can be frozen in the current environment because balance billing offers some relief for physicians. Without such a source of additional revenue, strong political pressure likely will influence rate adjustment decisions.
Even if there is no pressure to raise fees, the potential exists for increased demand by beneficiaries due to the elimination of balance billing. Demand would increase because patients would only face deductible and coinsurance obligations causing the net price of care to fall. Whether this extra demand is realized and program costs rise, however, would depend on physicians' willingness to provide services.
The final weakness of mandatory assignment is the lack of differentiation in fees for physicians regardless of physicians' qualifications or special circumstances, Interphysician differences, which policymakers consider to be valid justifications for compensation differentials, then must be recognized in the payment system itself. To the extent these compensation differences are not recognized, access to the highest-quality physicians may be threatened.
An Incentive Strategy
Both the current physician participation program and mandatory assignment strategies fall short in meeting the objectives delineated earlier. An alternative strategy is to increase the incentives to participate while at the same time providing exemption from balance billing to lowincome beneficiaries and/ or those with poor health status. The essence of this policy is to reduce Medicare reimbursement rates to nonparticipants, as under DEFRA, but not prohibit or limit balance billing. This ap proach should retain most physicians as potential Medicare providers but should address concerns about excessive financial burdens by increasing the number of physicians choosing participation.
Increasing the payment differential. The incentives to participate would come from paying less than allowed charges if physicians did not participate, but the full allowed charge less cost sharing to participants. The present 4 percent differential between allowed charges for participants and nonparticipants might be increased until the number of providers who chose to participate reached a desired level. There is no reason that the differential could not be substantially larger than it is now-say, 10 or 20 percent.
Under this approach, patients would not be penalized as severely for seeing a nonparticipating physician as under mandatory assignment. Patients retain access to all physicians if they are willing and able to pay. They would, however, have substantial financial incentives to seek a participating physician. Medicare reimbursement at, say, only 80 percent of the allowed charge considerably increases the cost to the patient of choosing a nonparticipating physician.
Physicians would have stronger incentives to become participants than under current policy. As patients see the financial benefit from using participating physicians, nonparticipants would risk losing business and, in all likelihood, some would choose to participate. At the same time, nonparticipating physicians who can continue to attract patients despite the reduced payment can continue to balance bill. (Some form of the MAAC limits might be retained, although Exhibit 3 suggests they might not be needed as financial protection.) This eases the pressure on the system to reward higher-cost physicians, while reducing the subsidy currently available to patients who wish to exercise this choice.
The program benefits because its costs are reduced by paying, say, only 80 percent of the allowed fee to nonparticipants. It also may have greater control over its costs over time because physicians can become nonparticipants if fees are perceived as being too low. With mandatory assignment, the level and rate of growth in fees are crucial. With balance billing remaining available as an option, though with reduced public subsidy, greater control over payment rates can be exercised.
Exempt patients from balance billing. The second component of the strategy would be to exempt beneficiaries from balance billing on the basis of income and / or health status. Under current arrangements, physicians must accept assignment on Medicaid patients, regardless of their decisions on other patients. The new Medicare catastrophic bill will extend Medicaid coverage to all elderly below the poverty line by January 1, 1992. By exempting other. beneficiaries from balance billing on a patient-by-patient basis, this requirement would be applied to a broader group of individuals. 3 We could, for example, exempt from balance billing those who have reached the new Medicare catastrophic threshold. Together with the exemption of joint Medicare-Medicaid beneficiaries, most vulnerable groups should be protected.
All physicians would be required to accept assignment for these patients and would be paid Medicare allowed charges. Patients generally would be responsible for deductibles and coinsurance (unless covered by Medicaid). Nonexempt patients still would be subject to balance billing on nonassigned claims; they also would pay deductibles and coinsurance. Exempt patients would have assigned claims paid to physicians at the full allowed charge level, both participants and nonparticipants. These provisions assure that financial barriers to access by poor and/ or very sick patients are not the mechanism by which the incentive strategy works. However, because most Medicare beneficiaries would not be exempt, they would have incentives to seek participating physicians.
This arrangement would assure the availability of a large pool of physicians because nonparticipation and balance billing would be permitted, though not as generously underwritten as before. At the same time, financial burdens on the most vulnerable would be formally eliminated, while others could avoid financial strains because the pool of participating physicians should increase. Medicare would have less political opposition to efforts to constrain rate increases and program costs because dissatisfied nonparticipating physicians could increase charges to most of their patients. Finally, intraphysician compensation differences would be permitted for those physicians able to retain a sufficient number of Medicare patients who can pay balance billing charges.
Policy Implications
Data from the post-DEFRA era show clearly. that the participation program has increased assignment rates and has reduced the total burden of balance billing. As long as allowed charges are not permitted to fall substantially relative to billed charges, this policy should produce fairly stable or growing assignment rates. In all likelihood, however, budgetary pressures will lead Medicare to constrain allowed charges. Some physicians will respond by dropping their participant status, causing assign-78 HEALTH AFFAIRS | Spring 1989 ment rates to fall.
Any policy that gives physicians the freedom to choose their degree and type of program involvement-even mandatory assignment-will be subject to supply responses if program payment rates fall. The real question when considering mandatory assignment is: Do we want patients to be forced to change physicians or receive no benefits if their physicians feel Medicare rates are too low to warrant a 100 percent commitment to assignment (given their Medicare patient level)? The answer is most certainly no. Policies should not force patients who are willing and able to afford balance billing to give up this alternative. Without this option, the program is running the risks of severely restricted access and constant pressure to keep Medicare fees on par with those in the privately insured market. Neither of these risks seems prudent for Medicare.
The participation program should be continued with the incentives for physicians to join the program strengthened. By increasing the differential in allowed charges between participants and nonparticipants, Medicare will be using market forces effectively to reduce the financial burden of balance billing. This would occur as an increasing number of beneficiaries move to participating physicians or as the threat of this movement motivates growth in the numbers of participants.
In some instances, market forces may not produce desirable results. For example, it may not be advisable for a chronically ill patient whose physician opts for nonparticipation to seek out another provider. In addition, there may be areas of the country in which the number of participants-either in general or specialty practice-is so low that the option of changing physicians is not available. If Medicare maintained balance billing, access would not be cut off in these instances. However, to ensure that Medicare's poorest and sickest beneficiaries are insulated from financial hardships, we propose exempting these patients from balance billing. This could be done in much the same way that Medicare/ Medicaid dual eligibles are currently exempt.
Choices about assignment policy are complicated further by the likelihood of some type of means testing of Medicare benefits as a way of meeting impending budgetary shortfalls. By requiring middle-and upper-class elderly Americans to pay higher premiums under the catastrophic health insurance bill or by including some share of Medicare Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) benefits in taxable income, Medicare will be increasing the cost of SMI benefits for many beneficiaries. If mandatory assignment also were adopted, the increased financial costs would be borne at the same time that many of the same elderly were facing limited access to care. Imposing both may undermine the broadbased political support the program has always enjoyed.
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Medicare has always aimed at providing access to the mainstream of American medicine for the elderly. This is best done by keeping the relationship between physicians and patients flexible. Mandatory assignment would move away from this historical commitment and could lead to increased program costs if access problems develop. Our proposed incentive strategy is an extension of the successful DEFRA policy in that it retains choices with respect to participation as well as assignment and billed charges (for nonparticipants). It goes beyond DEFRA in that it would impose greater costs for nonparticipation while exempting the most vulnerable segments of the Medicare population from balance billing. In making this argument, we acknowledge that the Canadian experience has been just the opposite, suggesting that the easier it is for physicians to balance bill, the more difficult it is to control fees. The evidence from Quebec indicates that a mandatory participation agreement was consistent with strong controls over fees. However, since Quebec's program had universal and comprehensive coverage, physicians had little choice (other than migration) but to accept low fee increases. This is clearly not the case in the United States, where Medicare accounts for only 20 percent of physician revenues. Too many U.S. physicians can simply limit or cease program participation altogether. Evidence from Canadian provinces that allow balance billing suggests that they were successful in controlling fees throughout the late 1970s; however, concern over low fees and the extent of balance billing led to generous fee settlements in the early 1980s, with the greatest fee increases in the provinces that had the most balance billing. P. Manga, The Policy Economy of Extra Billing (Ottawa: The Canadian Council on Social Develop ment, 1983 ). This provides a clear warning that even with balance billing, Medicare cannot fall too far out of line with the private market. 3. Such a policy exists in France, where patients with low incomes, any of twenty-five designated illnesses, hospital stays of longer than thirty days, and long costly treatments resulting in payments of over ninety French francs per month are exempt from coinsurance payments. See M. Duriez, C. Glarmet, and S. Sandier, "Physician Compensation in France," unpublished paper, 1984.
